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THE ORIGINS OF THE SERVICE STATE:
ON THE IRONIES OF INTERVENTION*
TIMOTHY W. LUKE





This essay discusses the growth of the
interventionist "service state" in the
United States since the 1890s. It
indicates how the exhaustion of the
national entrepreneurial capitalist model
necessitated state management of the econ-
omy, society and culture in order to
consolidate the emergence of a trans-
national monopoly capitalist mode of econ-
omic growth. These bureaucratic interven-
tions, however, from the 1930s through the
1970s dangerously eroded the continuing
reproduction of civil society. Hence, the
new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s
are discussed as popular efforts to coun-
tervail the bureaucratic logic of monopoly
capital and the service state. The new
social movements' focus on popular partic-
ipation, community-building and political
empowerment, in turn, might provide the
organizational basis for creating new
democratic economic, political and social
alternatives to the over-administered con-
sumer society constructed by the service
state and transnational capital during the
20th century.
A new sense of irony pervades the
leading academic, corporate and government
circles in the United States as the current
debates of the malaise of advances
industrial society have unfolded during the
present decade. It now appears, somewhat
ironically, that the complex bureaucratic
tools of corporate and state intervention,
which initially were conceived during the
Progressive Era, haphazardly constructed
under the New Deal, and then, eventually
employed after 1945 to manage economic
growth and social development, in the last
analysis, dangerously have eroded the most
basic psychological and social foundations
of industrial life. Ultimately, bureau-
cratic intervention has become a form of
cultural subversion whose corrosive impact
now manifests itself in profound social
psychological crises: the "cultural contra-
dictions of capitalism," the "fall *of
public man," and the "culture of narcis-
sism" (Bell, 1976; Sennett, 1976; and
Lasch, 1978). My purposes here, then are
to illustrate briefly how the emergence of
managerial capitalism, the formation of the
service state, and the development of
consumer society has led to these unex-
pected outcomes in present-day political
affairs. And, in turn, I hope to suggest
tentatively how the ensuing cultural crises
possibly be mitigated.
I. Managerial Capitalism and the Service
State
Over the course of America's rapid
industrialization from the 1860s through
the 1890s, farsighted corporate and mana-
gerial leaders began to see the promising
light of industrial co-operation and corp-
orate regulation gleaming through the
cracks of their competitive entrepreneurial
practices. Throughout the Gilded Age, as
production became more technology-
intensive, as distribution increasingly de-
manded more elaborate managerial struc-
tures, and as consumption began to concen-
trate rapidly in new urban centers,
traditional liberal philosophies espousing
individual initiative, market competition
and free enterprise seemed to point only
down dead-end roads. To find a new formula
for economic growth beyond classic liber-
alism, corporate leaders, such as Inter-
national Harvester's George W. Perkins,
increasingly favored market regulation and
corporate concentration "because the end of
competition would lead to more efficient
industrial practices and the production of
cheaper and better goals" (Spring, 1972,
8).
Entrepreneurial capitalism's gradual ex-
pansion, which began during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, (Wallerstein,
1974) encountered its practical limits in
the late 1880s and early 1890s. Until that
time, entrepreneurial capital transformed
global economic relations by extending its
rationalizing influence through trade and
conquest into the comparatively pre-
rational societies of the Eastern and
Southern hemispheres. Yet, as the ink
dried on the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 --
formalizing Europe's subdivision of the
last unclaimed regions of the pre-
captialist world -- and as Frederick
Jackson Turner called attention to the
closing of the great North American
Frontiers in the mid-1890s, the world
economy was shaken severely by a massive
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depression in 1893 whose impact forced the
shaky entrepreneurial-capitalistic mode of
production to change its operational rules.
To effect these operational innovations
the more progressive business, industrial,
and intellectual elites of America and
Europe recognized the necessity of trans-
forming capital from its traditional mode
of e expansion via entrepreneurial
commerce to a more organized mode of prod-
uction, namely, centralized corporate con-
centration based upon intensive means of
technical rationalization guided by scien-
tific research. Hence, the transitional
strategy from entrepreneurial to monopoly
capital demanded greater state inter-
vention, produced in the form of regulatory
services, in order to coordinate the
rational concentration of capital, the
technical re-organization of labor, and the
central management of social interaction in
labor unions, schools, and the family.
Many leaders of the Amcrican corporate
community recognized that such a transform-
ation could only be worked out in a part-
nership with the federal government, which
was the only political institution with the
powers to unite the diverse regions,
classes, and industries of the pluralistic
American polity into a cooperative whole.
The individuals, in turn, organized groups
like the National Civic Federation in 1900,
to encourage "some form of government
regulation which would. allow for the
c6ritinued existence of the new corporate
structures" (Spring, 1972, 10) in addition
to collaborating with organized labor.
During the Progressive Era, such figures as
Herbert Croly in The Promise of American
Life (1901) and Woodrow Wilson in The
Freedom (1913), both maintained that Yankee
industry, modern science, and governmental
authority should be used to place "our
businessmen and producers under the stim-
ulation of a constant necessity to be
efficient, economic, and enterprising"
(Wilson, 1913, 22). Croly maintained that
"in becoming responsible for the subord-
ination of the individual to the demand of
a dominant and constructive national
purpose, the American state will in effectbe making itself responsible for a morally
and socially desirable distribution of
wealth" (Croly, 1909, 23). Similarly,
International Harvester's George W. Perkins
nominated Washington as the arena to "which
our great business problems could go for
final adjustment when they could not be
settled otherwise" (Spring, 1972, 9). For
Perkins and many corporate leaders, the
mechanism for coping successfully with the
unprecedented demands of stabilizing, corp-
orate industrial capitalism "would seem to
lie through the medium of co-operation,
with federal supervision" (Spring, 1972,
9).
At this juncture, corporate managers
and the leadership of the central govern-
ment laid the foundations for a service
state by assuming "that a democratically
elected government, together with a bus-
iness system dominated by private enter-
prise, can and should work in consonance to
achieve certain economic objectives"
(Ulmer, 1969, 4). These "objectives"
turned out to be jointly defined, but
corporate-provided and government-protected
"minimum standards of income, nutrition,
health, housing, and education, assured to
every citizen as a political right"
(Wilensky, 1975). Consequently, the his-
toric task of the service state was to
create the new collective social services
that managerial capitalism required for its
continued rational growth and productivity.
Since the inception of the service state
idea, then, as Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.
observes, "the government's most signi-
ficant role has been in shaping markets for
the goods and services of modern business
enterprise" (1977, p. 494).
Beginning slowly with Theodore
Roosevelt's and Woodrow Wilson's admini-
strations, and maturing fully under
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, a new
state formation gradually was pieced to-
gether from: a) executive departments and
federal judiciary of the national govern-
ment; b) the managerial cadres of the new
corporate elite; and, c) the corporate
design for a society based on the mass
consumption of material goods. Roscoe
Pound has identified this political form-
ation as a "service state," or a "state
which, instead of- preserving peace and
order and employing itself with maintaining
the2 general security, takes the whole
domain of human welfare for its province
and would solve all economic and social
ills through its administrative activities"
(Pound, 1952, 211). There arises with it
"the idea that all public services must and
can only be performed by the government --
that politically organized society and that
alone is to be looked to for everything,
and that there is no limit to the services
to humanity which it can perform" (Pound,
1952, 212-213). The service state fully
embodies "the idea of regimented cooper-
ation for the general welfare;" and, as it
develops, it becomes "par Excellence a
bureau state. From the very nature of
administration, the bureau state calls for
a highly organized official hierarchy"
(Pound, 1952, 213). Hence, the iaii
ratio of the service state regime flows out
of its instrumentally rational administra-
tion, typically mediated through the large
centralized bureaucracy, whose dominant
inclination is to foreclose alternative
institutional and political options in
order "to organize the entire society in
its interest and image" (Marcuse, 1972,
11).
In doing so, the service state openly
supports the operations of the corporate
economy and society bureaucratically: a) by
intervening in industrial production
through manipulation of aggregate demand,
the money supply, employment levels, the
price structure of commodities, or trade
conditions to manage the business cycle; b)
by stimulating increased technical innova-
tion and scientific research developments
to rationalize the technical means of
production; c) by providing on a uniform,
mass basis new educational, health,
welfare, regulatory, commercial and legal
services to improve productivity and expand
consumption; d) by generating new markets
for new public and private goods ranging
from suburban housing, interstate highways
or advanced weaponry to expanded leisure
time, new consumer goods or mass college
education; and, e) by encouraging new forms
of social individuality based on clientage
in providing "helping" social personal and
family services.
Still, the service state could not
assume this administrative mission in a
vacuum. On the contrary, the impetus
behind its administration of social rela-
tion came through its close collaboration
with the managerial structures of corporate
capital. In addition to encouraging state
intervention and regulation, many corporate
groups altered their internal control
structures by expanding the organizational
roles played by professional engineers and
managers vis-a-vis the owner-entrepreneur
within the firm. To assure the survival of
corporate industrial production, these new
corporate leaders gradually seperated the
functions of "managing" from "owning" and
"planning" from "producing,' which took
control of corporate capital away from the
owners and control of productive skills
away from the workers to entrust it to
these new professional administrators and
technicians.
Therefore, in 1900, General Electric
opened the first corporate industrial
laboratory in the United States to apply
systematically rational scientific investi-
gation to the business of production. By
1913-1914, Henry Ford installed the
continuously moving assembly line in his
Highland Park plant, which had been made
possible, in part, by Taylor's, Fayol's,
Gantt's, and Gilbreth's contributions to
"scientific management." (1) By separating
"planning" from "doing," or theory from
practice, skill from activity, and thought
from action, Taylorization began to strip
the American working classes of their
skills. Because of their alleged command
over "the art of bringing ends and means
together -- the art of purposeful action"
(American Institute of Management, 1974,
23) in the daily management of the large
industrial firm, These organizational
trends legitimized the growing admini-
strative regime of state bureaucrats and
corporate managers.
In turn, the classic entrepreneurial
capitalist forms of social exchange,
personal identity, individual needs, and
ethical beliefs slowly have been redefined
in t-he United States to suit the demands of
instrumental rationality, namely, corporate
capital's economically-efficient, large-
scale, high-volume exploitation of material
and social resources. Thus, many large,
multidivisional industrial firms such as
Westinghouse, DuPont, General Motors,
Standard Oil, and General Electric, began
after World War I to link closely their
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prductiv capacity with their newly-formed
inngyaii. (in-house research and devel-
opment units) and distributive (intra-
company and inter-firm advertising, market-
ing, financial, and service divisions)
capacities to not only produce familiar
products for existing markets, but to
actually create and, then, administer
completely new markets for new kinds of
goods and services that would satisfy
newly-created and corporate-defined indivi-
d (Ewen, 1976). As Chandler
suggests, "After World War I the most
important developments in the history of
modern business enterprises in the United
States did not come from enterprises
involved in carrying out a single basic
activity such as transportation, commun-
ication, marketing, or finance. Nor did
they come from firms that only manufac-
tured. They appeared rather in large
industrials that integrated production with
distribution. . .by moving into new
products for new markets" (Chandler, 1977,
472-473).
These corporate goals, however,
necessarily assumed the creation of a new
kind of social individuality that no longer
counterposed the respective interests of
individuals and society, but rather
integrated them by subordinating the former
to the latter. Theodore Roosevelt, as an
exponent of 1rogre-:ivism, called for the
United States to ievelo- "a systeni under
which each individual citizen shall be
organized with his fellows so that can work
efficiently together" (Spring, 1972, 13).
Only by fitting exactly the specialized
tasks to which corporate capital might fit
him -- both as a producer and consumer --
could this individual adequately fulfill
his new socialization which "consists
primarily in the discipline which he
undergoes to fit him both for fruitful
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association with his fellows and for his
own special work" (Spring, 1972, 18).
Yet, with intense specialization in one
area, each individual became incapable of
dealing with an increasingly complex exist-
ence beyond the scope of his own narrow
expertise. This trend, in turn, requires
the further "stimulation of infantile
cravings by advertising, the usurption of
parental authority by the media and the
false promise of personal fulfillmentn
(Lasch,1978, 43) to accommodate individuals
to the new needs being presented in the
consumer-based society of managerial capit-
alism. And "having surrendered most of his
technical skills to the corporation, he can
no longer provide-for his material needs";
thus, this corporate-designed form of
social individuality slowly erodes "every-
day competence, in one area after another,
and has made the individual dependert on
the state, the corporation, and the othei
bureaucracies" (Lasch, 1978, 10-11).
Despite the central government planning
experience of WW I and the expansion of
corporate diversification in the 1920s, all
of these attempts at macroeconomic
organization could not forestall, in turn,
the economic and political crises of the
Great Depression in the 1930s. Of course,
the American service state initially
resorted to socially repressive legislation
such as accepting the organization of
corporate "sociology" departments,
beginning prohibition, and pursuing the
Palmer raids, as a means of disciplining
the populace. However, these direct inter-
ventions proved inferior to the gradual
construction of "consumption communities"
(Boorstin, 1973, 89-166). Instead of state
bureaucracies overtly repressing the
working classes, the workers as consumers
were prompted to discipline tmseve
strictly in order to satisfy "their" new
needs and gain access to Model T's, the
suburbs, Woolworth's and the movies.
Still, "the creation of these markets
necessitated an abolition of the social
memories which militated against con-
sumption" (Ewen and Ewen, 1978, 48). In
the process, great deal of the social self-
reliance, ethnic uniqueness and personal
autonomy that was cultivated under entre-
preneurial capitalism was eclipsed by the
new needs imposed by mass consumption and
government regulation. For the self-
sufficient individuals who matured beyond
the reach of managerial capitalism, the new
service state promoted "the consumption of
their traditional relationship to nature,
the destruction of skills by which that
relationship was carried on, and the
exhaustion of the social forms of customary
life" as the "primary projects of American
mass industrialism" (Ewen and Ewen, 1978,
48).
During Wilson's administrations, a
number of programs and policies launched
the service state's activities in America.
The Federal Reserve Act (1913) and the
Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) gave
the federal executive and its bureaucracies
the rudimentary tools to manipulate
corporate activity and expansion through
the national money supply and commercial
codes. The Underwood Tariff Act (1913) and
the Federal Farm Loans Act (1916) enabled
the central government to open the hitherto
restricted American market to crucial new
centers of production and consumption
around the world and to begin experiments
in financing domestic agricultural produc-
tion. By the same token, the spirited
enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
(1890) and the passage of the Clayton Act
(1914) "hastened the growth of big business
in the United States" inasmuch as their
interpretation by the court system "pro-
vided a powerful pressure that did not
exist elsewhere to force family firms to
consolidate their operations into a single,
centrally-operated enterprise administered
by salaried managers," (Chandler, 1977,
499) and, each of these new policies slowly
solidified the bonds between managerial
capital and the national service state as
they "fulfilled the same purpose of
bringing private interests into the
interior processes of government" (Lowi,
1969).
Moreover, a whole new wave of new
debates and legislation arose as part of
the Progressives' visions of the "New Free-
dom". As part of the on-going effort to
discipline each individual to more closely
integrate him into the administrative
regime of large corporate and state
bureaucracies, the Nineteenth Amendment
(1920) granted women a greater stake in the
system through the formal right to vote.
Similarly, the Eighteenth Amendment (1919)
empowered state bureaucracies with the task
of policing the adult population's leisure
time activities through prohibition to make
them more "responsible" citizens and
workers. And, perhaps more importantly, to
finance this new regime of bureaucratic
administration, the Sixteenth Amendment
(1913) was enacted to rationalize the tax
system of the central government. But, in
so doing, the service state began to
severely limit individual choice in that it
gradually took "from the people more and
more of their personal property and has
determined how it should be distributed"
(Moley, 1952, 187).
To illustrate, however, the tremendous
expansion of state control over social
relations that emerged with managerial
capitalism, one need only consider the
revolutionary fiscal, labor and social
welfare legislation of the New Deal. With
the crisis of the 1930s, the political
caution and corporate hesitation that had
characterized many of the Progressives'
modifications of the classical market
formulae disappeared under the federal
state's bureaucratically contrived plans
for a national industrial recovery. As the
national income fell by half from 1929 to
1932, corporate leaders becase more willing
to cooperate especially as the large
multidivisional firms -- such as General
Motors and General Electric -- saw
themselves operating at twenty-five percent
capacity in 1932 (Chandler, 1977, 496). As
Gardiner C. Means claims, the New Deal was
a "complete turning away from the classizal.
model" in a collective search for "policies
consistent both with the changed market
structure and with a democratic society"
(1964, 42). Consequently, the service
state redoubled its interventionist efforts
to control the intra-class (divisions among
corporate groups, industrial sectors and
financial circles) and inter-clagaa (clashes
between labor and management, agriculture
and industry) conflicts that had abetted
the coming of the 1930s Depression.
Here, the service state mobilized a
familiar solution, namely, the "delegation
of state power to monopolistic private
organizations" (Wolfe, 1977, 144) largely
based in the corporate sector. Its
initial, and most important, moves came in
overhauling the monetary system and credit
structure. Banking reforms, monetary circ-
ulation changes and international banking
connections were altered mainly under the
Banking Act of 1935 to transfer "power over
open market policies from New York to
Washington" making the credit supply and
monetary management "a practical instrument
of government" (Means, 1964, 31). At the
same time, federal fiscal management turned
to deficit spending as an instrument of
stimulating production and market demand.
Simultaneously, a whole series of
bureaucratic agencies charged with the task
of encouraging administratively the corpor-
ate sector's productivity were organized by
the state. The industrial codes of the
National Recovery Administration, despite
its brief term of operation, successfully
launched a general economic recovery during
Roosevelts first administration and accust-
omed many corporate leaders, in spite of
their grave reservations, to the state's
activist role in the economy. Similarly, a
whole series of diverse agencies were
founded to stimulate production, provide
jobs, give access to-services, and regulate
economic activity, Here, the Agricultural
Administration, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, the Works Progress Adminis-
tration, The Tennessee Valley Authority,
The Rural Electrification Administration,
and the Civil Works Administration all
provided a variety of services by means of
the federal state recruiting its personnel
from and sharing its power with the
corporate or private groups most directly
affected by its administrative inter-
vention.
The same principles held true for
organized labor. Continuing the theme of
corporate collaboration, Samuel Gompers
maintained that "the trade union movement
is labor's constructive contribution to
democratic regulation of large scale
production" (Spring, 1972, 7). Although
many of labor's leaders shared this
perspective, most corporate groups contin-
ued to oppose organized labor even after it
was granted its "Magna Carta" in the
Clayton Act during 1914. Before 1933, most
American workers basically remained craft-
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oriented in their skills, shopfloor
society, and labor organization. Partly
broken by the scientific management move-
ment and the assembly line system after
1910, the American working classes were
still politically resistive and collect-
ively unorganized up to the 1930s. Only
one in ten American workers belonged to a
union -- mainly craft unions -- and
individual workers, as citizens and
consumers, were subjected to the repressive
policies of prohibition, political harass-
ment of their ethnic society, and a rigid
assimilation myth rooted in WASP conformity
(Blackman, 1974, 19-25).
Beginning with the NRA and its Section
7A, however, the American labor movement
slowly was integrated into the service
state regime to assure that labor militancy
would not short circuit the national
industrial recovery. The principle of
federally mediated collective bargaining
was established as a firm precedent and
gradually acknowledged by business circles.
Passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
National Industrial Recovery Act, the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, the
Public Contracts (Healy) Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards (Wage and Hour) Act all
contributed to the halting efforts being
made towards the rational administration of
labor. In keeping with the logic of the
service state, the determination of issues
central to the individual's identity, inde-
pendence and dignity such as minimum hours,
wage scales, unionization, hiring, firing,
disability compensation, personal welfare
and contract bargaining all were reduced to
regulated routine procedures by the
bureaucratic administration of the federal
labor bureaus, the large corporations and
the national labor unions. What is more,
in being promised some limited say over
these material concerns, the union mem-
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bership sacrificed job control issues, and
subsequently nalmost never asked to
participate in decisions concerning output,
pricing, scheduling and resource allo-
cation" (Chandler, 1977, 494) in corporate
decision-making.
All of these varied measures, in turn,
were further strengthened during World War
II as "the mobilization of the war economy
brought corporation managers to Washington
to carry out one of the most complex pieces
of economic planning in history" (Chandler,
1977, 496). The bureaucratic rationality
of the service state continued to unfold in
the new wartime administrative offices --
the National War Labor Board, the Office of
Price Administration, the War Manpower
Commission, etc. The relative success of
these measures "lessened ideological
anxieties about the government's role in
stabilizing the economy. Then the fear of
postwar recession and consequent return of
mass unemployment brought support for
legislation to commit the federal govern-
ment to maintaining full employment and
aggregate demand" (Chandler, 1977, 496).
Passage of the Employment Act of 1946 and
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act of 1947 reaffirmed the
partnership of the service state and man-
agerial capital to direct bureaucratically
the internal processes of mass consumer
society by maintaining programmed levels of
aggregate output, guaranteed employment,
predictable consumer demand and bureau-
cratically mediated labor conflict.
By 1948, one in three workers belonged
to a labor union in the United States, and,
even in the 1970s one in four workers
remains affiliated with these corporate-
modelled and state-monitored unions. Thus,
by the 1950s, the American service state
and managerial capitalism effectively
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dismantled many of the old organic forms of
community that had evolved under entre-
preneurial capitalism. Clearly, packets of
"outsiders" hung on in the South, the West,
and in the decaying cores of many of the
nations largest cities. Still, with the
steadily expanding economy, the federal
government also stimulated the revolu-
tionary rearrangement of American urban
life by subsidizing purposely corporate
groups to expand housing construction in
the suburbs, to redesign urban transport-
ation around automotive expressway systems,
and to provide relatively cheap automotive
transportation and fuel in response to both
producer and consumer demands. As a
result, the traditional forms of organic
community and social organization slowly
disappeared into these new community struc-
tures of consumer society, while the
inevitable contradictions between workers
and owners, consumers and producers, labor
and capital, citizens and the state became
managerial problems to be dealt with by the
experts of large administrative bureau-
cracies in both the "public" and "private"
sector.
II. The Strategy Breaks Down
Meanwhile, internal political or social
opposition to the service state and man-
agerial capitalism continually was dis-
couraged and repressed. Groups and indi-
viduals preferring to define and satisfy
their own needs were encouraged through
advertising, public education and social
pressure to let their needs be defined by
state or corporate bureaucracies and, then,
satisfied by government-provided social
services and corporate-produced goods. The
state-employed professional educator was
presented as knowing more and better than
the parents; government-certified health
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and medical workers were billed as more
effective and rational than traditional
household hygiene; and, store-bought goods
were packaged to appear better than home-
made products. Also, subsequent waves of
government-sponsored red scares, witch
hunts, counter-intelligence activities and
McCarthyist purges, beginning in the 1900s
extending up to the present, stymied most
political opposition movements. Conse-
quently, the service state system, instead
of recycling the new ideas and practices of
its internal opposition as important
innovations, oppressed its opponents in
order to manage the popular political
process.
But, in having so strictly created the
administrative conditionf for the advanced
rationalization of corporate capital, the
service state after 1945 as it continued to
grow through the Fair Deal, the New
Frontier, and the Great Society --
systematically stifled traditional forms of
communicative interaction and individual
independence. The purposive-rationality of
bureaucratic organization become both less
purposive and less rational as it
eliminated pre-rational forms of social
interaction.
How was this possible? At one level,
the corporate and state health delivery
systems, for example, can train -- in a
very purposive-rational fashion -- more
doctors, build more hospitals and encourage
more office visits to improve national
health care and individual life expectancy.
Yet, this same system can function only by
relieving individuals of their own health
and medical care skills. So as the complex
health care system comes on line it
continues to expand to the point that
capital-intensive hospitals and expensively
trained doctors are dealing mainly with
ingrown toenails, common colds and minor
medical operations. Despite purposively
and rationally building a sophisticated
health delivery system, the robbing of
health and medical skills from individuals
by bureaucracies leaves life expectancy and
other health indicators steady or
declining.
Similarly, under service state
administration, state-supported mass
education made possible a tremendous
expansion of the schooling system that
purposively and rationally kept youth in
school longer learning increasingly more
sophisticated technical and social skills
to better integrate their labor power and
personality into the consumer society.
However, the construction and operation of
these educational administrations have led,
at the same time, to rampant undiscipline
and the failure to transfer skills. A
major implication of taking away skills and
responsibilities from most workers doing
most jobs has been the falling rate of
expectations and skills within education.
Functional illiteracy begins in elementary
school, considerable substantive ignorance
is rife among secondary school students and
thousands of college graduates are
systematically overtrained and under-
employed given the needs of the larger
society. Again, the bureaucratic adminis-
tration of education is neither purposive
nor rational.
Eventually, many potential bases for
social resistance, personal autonomy, or
political opposition gradually were buried
in the onslaught of mass marketed commod-
ities, mass public education, and collec-
tive benefits of social welfare programs.
Tradition succumbed to technique; yet,
technique could envince such superiority
only against and over tradition. Once
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rationalized to suit bureaucratic admini-
stration, the communicative interactions of
historically evolved communities lose thei
unique pit~oses and rationality under
"purposive-rational" bureaucracies. Once
the purposive-rational mode of action was
left only to its own bureaucratic devices,
as occured increasingly during the 1960s,
it proved neither purposive nor rational
either within its own formal operations or
in terms of its efficient delivery of
services. Limited intervention, ironically,
in the process of rationalizing social
activity, turned into comprehensive domin-
ation. By doing so, it often destroys the
very bases of personality, society and
community which it sought merely to reg-
ulate. Therefore, and equally ironic, one
survival tactic of -the service state and
managerial capital during the present
cirses -is a move towards revitalizing new
forms of social, political and cultural
reason tQ serve as alternative counter-
vailing powers against the instrumental
raionality that guides bureaucratic
administration.
Seen in this light, the rise of the New
Left, the New Right, and other "counter-
cultural" forces might be seen as one
outcome of limited decisions made within
the corporate and state structures to
encourage weak oppositional forces in
academia, the arts, the press and the
electronic media, which might serve as
countervailing goal-setting forces against
the service state's administrative regime.
In a parallel fashion, one might identify
the emergence of professional public inter-
est lobbies, such as Ralph Nader's task
forces, Barry Commoner 's environmental
institute, John Gardner's Common Cause
organization, Jerry Falwell's Moral Maj-
ority, or Howard J. Phillips' Conservative
Caucus, (Guinther, 1976; Lanouette, 1978,
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88-92) which strive to bureaucratically
mobilize interests against the bureaucratic
decision-making of large corporations of
the federal bureaucracy, as the new form
for political opposition of managerial
capitalism. Instead of being repressed,
these weak oppositional forces are
subsidized, lionized, and encouraged to
prod the bureaucratic apparatus to perform
more efficiently or humanely. (2) But,
these counter-bureaucratic forces do not
become powerful enough to disrupt of
dismantle the apparatus as it currently
functions -- as Nader's failure to get a
meaningful consumer protection agency
established, or Commoner's inability to
gain support for an effective energy
conservation bill, or Gardner's frustra-
tions at winning a meaningful electoral
reform program, or Falwell's difficulties
in resurrected "traditional American
values" all further illustrate.
In addition to these professional
counter-bureaucratic lobbies, new opposi-
tional mechanisms are being built into the
service state itself. Beginning with
Nixon's slow sabotage of various Great
Society programs and continuing under
Reagan's supply-side revolution, a new form
of federalism has been developing, which
seeks to halt the continuing subordination
of state and local governments to central
decision-makers. Instead of a single wel-
fare state system operating from Wash-
ington, the instruments of revenue sharing,
block grants, and community action programs
are giving state and local decision-makers
back some of the administrative discretion
appropriated by the federal bureaucracy
since the New Deal. Hence, the welfare
state idea has been injected into cities,
counties, and states as they too set up
their own welfare divisions, community
development'agencies, and economic inter-
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vention bureaus. In doing SO, these
multiple centers of power and decision-
making are checking, countering, and
countervailing the organizational dictates
of the federal administrative regime.
Similarly, Congress has counterattacked
against the Presidency in the early 1970s
to contain its "imperial" authority. Most
importantly, the Senate Watergate invest-
igations and the House impeachment
committees finally challenged the over-
whelming power of the President and ended
an executive regime that sought to
undermine the very democratic structures
which made its rule possible. The War
Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Act of 1974,
and the extensive expansion of the
Congressional staff after 1974 all were
significant new constraints on the
President's ability to make war, to dispose
of arbitrarily legally appropriated monies,
and to unjustly manipulate information.
These important legal developments, in turn
are not simply fortuitous reactions to the
Watergate affair. Rather they amount to a
systematic attempt to revitalize the
constitutional contradictions and political
conflicts between the executive and
legislative branches to keep the federal
government more manageable, responsive, and
controlled. And, as a result, these newly
engendered negative forces have kept three
Presidents -- Ford, Carter and Reagan --
well within the weakened scope of the post-
imperial Presidency. (3)
A variety of internal reforms have
developed to correct other excesses of the
service state. A number of bureaucratic
insurgency tactics. ranging from whistle-
blowing to public employee unionization to
information leaks as well as a series of
new anti-bureaucratic legislation, such as
sunshine laws, sunset provisions, and zero-
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based budgeting policies, have begun to
make bureaucratic decision-making more
accountable and responsible as the aura of
total power and total knowledge are pulled
away from bureaucratic practices.
Similarly, the service state is encouraging
increased citizen participation as part of
its standard operating procedures. Under
Carter, these practices were fostered as
exercises in democratic participatory
management, while Reagan has recast them as
advances for personal initiative, state's
rights and Yankee self-reliance.
To rebuild older cities or to reform
the welfare system, the service state is
favoring municipal action over federal
action, neighborhood action over municipal
action, and individual decisions over state
decisions. Thus, the revitalization of
personal decision-making, as a source of
opposition in the consumer society, grad-
ually is being built into the bureaucracy
in the form of professional community
organizers, citizen committees, community
liaison offices, and public hearings to
improve the bureaucratic delivery system.
Yet, the common thread uniting all of these
developments remains their attempt to
derail the purposive-rational uniformity of
the service state in favor of their self-
defined choices and community. These
efforts, moreover, emanate from within the
bureaucratic administration of the service
state, but are directed against the in-
creasing irrationalities of its admini-
strative activity.
III. Beyond the Service State
As the economic, political and social
crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s
have illustrated, the state and the cor-
porate social formations have confronted
challenges that their purposive-rational
logic no longer seems capable of suc-
cessfully managing. That is, the current
alliance of the service state and
managerial capital is gripped by a "ration-
ality crisis" which, in turn, entails an
equally threatening "legitimacy crisis."
Once the pre-rational communicative inter-
action of the larger society was submitted
to the raional imperatives of purposive-
rational management, the instruments of
social administration lose their original
purpose. Having gone beyond mere inter-
vention in the on-going historical process
of economic exchange and social relations,
the bureaucratic administration of mana-
gerial capitalism and the service state
became forms of complete domination. But,
in doing so, it destroyed the very forms of
organic community and individual autonomy
that prompted such administrative inter-
vention.
Consequently, communicative interaction
and emancipatory development, which ration-
al administration was to have assisted and
advanced, became frozen unnaturally in the
purposive-rational control of corporate and
state bureaucracies. Furthermore, these
breaks in technical control have led to a
legitimacy crisis. The service state's
essential mechanism of legitimation lies in
its administrative effectiveness at
providing the collective social "goods" of
political stability, economic growth, mass
consumption of consumer goods and social
wel'fare services. But, as the service
state's "rationality crisis" disrupts its
purposive-rational management of the econ-
omy, polity, and society, the admini-
strative effectiveness at delivering the
system's own self-defined social "goods" is
weakened substantially, which severely
shakes its "legitimacy" and rational
purposes. (4)
Counteracting the ironies of inter-
vention under these conditions, however,
means more than simply reconstituting
critical intellectual analysis and debate.
The essential need for individual part-
idii~tion necessarily demands the re-
politicization and renewed eductioni of
every individual to cultivate and use his
personal choices, political skills, and
individual discipline. Here, the activist
must do more than merely define and
criticize the mass de-politicization of the
service state. Instead, the theoretically-
informed politicization fo free individuals
in the organic communities of the family,
neighborhood, or urban locality must help
individuals escape from the naturalized
social behaviors of personal commodity
consumption, political apathy, and the
passive acceptance of bureaucratic policies
and mass culture to create new communities
of competence (Luke, 1981).
Political activists and social
theorists must elaborate new political
forms for realizing a social individuality
-- rooted in the organic community of the
neighborhood, the family, or the city --
instead of a commodified consumerist
personality; for personal political auton-
mfly -- based upon renewed popular inter-
action and displacement of bureaucratic
rule by reviewing indiyidual skills for
popular participation -- instead of passive
political client-dge; and, for individual
social judgment -- grounded in the sub-
stantive rationality of organic community
-- instead of the technical policy sciences
of the services state's administration.
Such a psychological renaissance, clearly,
will demand the rapid revitalization of
these autonomous public and private spheres
given their past fragmentation by the
service state. Nevertheless, these fresh
political spaces seem to be opening with
new social movements: the voluntary
simplicity movement, radical feminism, the
black consciousness movement, alternative
technology groups, the new ethnicity, and
the ecology movement. These groups, in
turn, could serve as the institutional
foundations for renewing personally
initiated and collectively conciliated
communicative interaction.
By imparting skills and values for
individual self-definition, self-consti-
tution, and self-determination as a free
individual interacting in a collectively
constituted public sphere, these new social
movements might be guided toward re-
developing personal autonomy. By critic-
ally reassessing pol-itics in this fashion,
the frozen social relations of consumer
society-- the bureaucratic objectification
of human behavior, the internalization of
personal domination, and the justification
of human dependence by reducing social
relations to a technocractic elite's
"authoritative allocation of values" -- can
be attacked to regenerate individual choice
and autonomy. At the same time, the
passive life of administered commodity-
consumption must be demonstrated decisively
to be degrading, dehumanizing, and inferior
to the active praxis of communal creation
promised by the participatory alternatives
to the service state. (5)
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